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Introduction  1
One of  Foucault’s most famous claims is that “Western man has become a confessing 
animal (bête d'aveu)” (Foucault, 1978, page 59). It is also one of  his most misunderstood. 
This paper traces the evolution in Foucault’s use of  confession (confession) and avowal 
(aveu) in his early work with two general objectives in mind: first, to obtain a better 
picture of  the evolution of  Foucault’s own thinking, particularly the roots of  his better-
known late work on these issues; and second, contribute towards the analytical 
development of  these two concepts in and beyond Foucault’s own work. 
The established approach to confession and aveu in Foucault’s work suggests these are 
conceptually and analytically interchangeable inasmuch as both terms are interpreted as 
indexing forms of  power through which the self  is enjoined upon to continuously 
monitor and speak truth about itself. Emblematic of  this approach is the account by 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, pages 119, 141, 145–146, 168–169, 
173–183, 186, 198, 203). This conception has made possible rich work, including 
Burchell’s analysis of  subjection/subjectivation and resistance (Burchell, 2009, pages 
159–177) and Elden’s important reconstruction of  the problem confession posed for 
Foucault in the genealogy of  his work (Elden, 2005, pages 23–41). It has also proven 
extraordinarily popular in its application across multiple subfields, including  Philosophy 
(Taylor, 2008), Political Theory (Bevir, 1999), Education Studies (Fejes and Dahlstedt, 
2013; Fejes and Nicoll, 2015), History (Karma, 1997), Legal Studies (Tadros, 1998), 
Nursing and Psychiatry (Roberts, 2005), International Relations (Salter, 2007), 
Anthropology (Van Maanen, 1988; cf. Webster, 2008), and Sociology (Rail, 2012).  
That being said, current scholarship offers no systematic analysis of  these concepts’ 
evolution in Foucault’s work. The current conflation of  aveu and confession results from a 
combination of  Foucault’s own sometimes ambiguous usage (e.g. in the Dartmouth 
lectures he uses ‘confession’ in English in a way reminiscent of  his use of  aveu in Louvain 
rather than confession in Government of  the Living (hereinafter GotL)) and of  differences in 
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the way the semantic fields of  aveu/confession overlap in French compared to avowal/
confession.  However, this state of  affairs is unsatisfactory; for example, GotL describes 2
confession as having distinct properties (Foucault, 2014a, page 84) in which a source of  
pathological deviance is located at the core of  the self, while in Dartmouth (1980) and 
Louvain (1981) Foucault focus on the avowal as the moment of  the mise en discours of  the 
subject, omitting references to a deviant alterity. The implied economies of  power in 
these two cases will be shown to be profoundly different.  
To trace Foucault’s shifting usage, this article provides a systematic overview of  his 
use of  the two terms, adopting a roughly chronological approach and drawing from all 
published English and French sources. Given the magnitude of  the task, this first 
contribution will focus on Foucault’s production between 1954 and 1972. The latter cut-
off  point was chosen based on the fact that currently available material suggests it is only 
after this point that Foucault starts thinking in more explicit and systematic terms about 
aveu and confession. His final lecture in the 1971-72 cycle offers important reflections on 
the avowal, but Foucault offers no explicit definition of  avowal, nor does he relate it to 
confession. By contrast, by 1973, he offers a definition of  the avowal, and in the 1974-75 
Abnormal lectures he distinguishes between avowal and confession, and – to a degree – 
reflects on their articulation(s). The article therefore notes when and how Foucault’s own 
usage varies, indicating when aveu and confession are being used in the sense of  admission 
as in the more common English usage; when confession is used in a sacramental sense; and 
what conceptual and analytical value Foucault’s texts give beyond common usage. 
Accordingly, French terms have been bracketed in order to better reflect the original and 
bring to light the distinction between confession (confession) and avowal (aveu).  
As a meter of  comparison, this article adopts Foucault’s earliest definitions of  aveu 
and confession. The first definition of  confession (confession) in published work is given 
indirectly in the 1972-73 lectures entitled La Société Punitive (The Punitive Society), in which 
Foucault refers to sacramental confession, claiming that “catholic confession (confession) is 
ways in which [individual behaviour] is made to enter into a kind of  discursivity 
[characterized] by the fact that it is the subject himself  who speaks [about himself]; it 
never leaves an archive; and the discursivity to which confession (confession) gives rise falls 
within the frame of  something like casuistry” (Foucault, 2013a). The first formal 
definition of  avowal (aveu) Foucault gives dates from 1975: “the avowal (aveu) consists in 
the discourse of  the subject on himself, in a situation of  power in which it is dominated, 
constrained, and which, by [means of] the avowal (par l’aveu) it modifies” (Foucault, 
2001e, page 1677). This definition is notably close to the one offered in the much more 
detailed examination of  the avowal in the 1981 Louvain lectures, “a verbal act through 
which the subject affirms who he is, binds himself  to this truth, places himself  in a 
 In French aveu is primarily associated with admission in a juridical context, and while confession can be 2
used in that context it is primarily associated with Christian sacramental practice (Brion and Harcourt, 
2014, pages 1–2n). However, the English usage of  ‘confession’ is evenly split between the two contexts, 
and since ‘to avow’ is nearly archaic, the transposition of  both French terms with a singular English 
counterpart is intuitively plausible.
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relationship of  dependence with regard to another, and modifies at the same time his 
relationship to himself ” (Foucault, 2014b, page 17). On the other hand, the conceptual 
structures of  both definitions are significantly different from the articulation of  confession 
offered in the 1979-1980 Government of  the Living lectures in which he presents confession 
as a particular kind of  ‘regime of  truth,’ and calls the avowal a ‘reflexive truth act’ located 
at the core of  confession, while clearly distinguishing it from avowal. In the same lectures 
he defines avowal as “the purest and also historically most important form of  this 
reflexive form of  the truth act is what we call confession (l’aveu) […] a truth act in which 
the subject is at once actor of  the alethurgy, […] he is witness […] and finally, third, […] 
he is its object” (Foucault, 2014a, page 82) where “the truth act (acte de vérité) […] may be 
defined (1) by the subject’s role as operator of  the alethurgy, (2) by the subject’s role as 
spectator of  it, and (3) by the subject’s role as the object itself  of  the 
alethurgy” (Foucault, 2014a, page 81). 
With these definitions in mind, this article makes two claims. First, during this period, 
by the standard of  his late definitions, while all elements of  aveu and confession are present 
in Foucault’s early work, nowhere are they explicitly linked. Instead, references to aveu 
and confession broadly occupy the same semantic field as ‘admission’, being primarily 
linked to quasi-judicial procedures (e.g. in secular and religious justice, psychiatry, etc.).  
Secondly, the article shows that Foucault’s work during this period nonetheless 
displays discernible conceptual differentiation between aveu and confession which will 
emerge with greater clarity in his later work. The article argues that there are in fact not 
two but three economies of  power which these terms cover. First, confession/avowal as 
admission of  law-breaking, which entails a one-off  interaction between the individual 
and a legal framework which expects an avowal but makes no assumptions about the 
nature of  the avowing subject. Second, avowal in a space such as the asylum: a 
contingent act which entails a similarly singular event, which makes possible linear 
trajectory of  emancipation from unreason towards reason understood as ontologically 
separate categories. Finally, third, something Foucault will later sometimes call 
‘sacramental confession’, a relation of  power articulated in a very specific way around the 
avowal in which the avowing subject’s normalisation is undermined by a subjectivity 
already and necessarily marked by flawed, stained nature, i.e. a figure in which the other 
remains trapped by its ontological distinctiveness, undermining the putatively 
emancipatory transformation enjoined upon it by the listening subject who demands the 
avowal. These differences become increasingly pronounced throughout the 1970s until 
they culminate in the analyses outlined in the 1981 Louvain (Foucault, 2012b, 2014b), 
1980 Dartmouth (Foucault, 1993), and 1980 Government of  the Living (Foucault, 2012a, 
2014a) lectures.  
This article shows that while avouer in the sense of  admission in a juridical context 
entails mise en discours of  the subject, it does not necessarily entail a permanent imperative 
to do so. The latter requires an unstable, inscrutable, and ultimately dangerous selfhood, 
which emerges from Foucault’s analysis of  sacramental confession. As Foucault’s later 
work argues, only a specific chain of  historical events – the transformations of  Christian 
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penitence from Tertullian through monastic practices to the Council of  Trent, the 
problems of  the abnormal, degeneration, delinquency, etc. – will produce figures such as 
the sinner or the delinquent, and it is only the permanence of  these instabilities and 
dangers that can make the demand for the avowal – and thus the subject’s mise en discours 
– continuous. It is only when this otherness is made pathological and placed into the 
innermost reaches of  each individual that the demand for the avowal can become 
permanent. In this sense, confession describes a very different form of  power from the 
avowal. In the conflation of  aveu and confession both in general and specifically in English 
translation, it is precisely this role of  pathology at an ontological level which is left 
unexamined. 
Avowal as a Bridge between Reason and Unreason 
Foucault’s first book, Maladie mentale et personnalité (Foucault, 1954),  contains no 3
references to aveu or confession. In his second book, History of  Madness (Foucault, 1961, 
2006), the terms aveu and confession appear infrequently and with only traces of  the 
analytical frameworks Foucault would attach to them in later work. In most instances, 
confession indicates the Christian ritual in the strict sense – i.e. not analysed as a more 
general schema of  power relations – and in the development of  avowal-based 
technologies of  the self, which Foucault will from the mid-1970s sketch the spread of  
throughout the social body. This ‘common sense’ usage appears in the following 
passages: 
As was the case in every other hospital in the Catholic  world their only obligation was to 
make a mandatory confession (confession), as was required from all patients who entered the 
hospital (Foucault, 2006, pages 83–84). 
There is first of  all the weight of  a tradition, the tradition of  theologians and casuists, and 
also the tradition of  lawmakers and judges. Provided he expresses a few of  the external signs of  
penitence, a madman can receive confession (confession) and absolution (Foucault, 2006, page 208). 
When the confessor encountered ‘hypochondriac patients who went to confession (confession) 
too often’, he either gave them as penance a severe punishment that ‘diluted their thick, sluggish 
blood’, or sent them on a long pilgrimage (Foucault, 2006, page 368). 
Her confessor (confesseur), after advising her in vain to attach herself  to God, showed her cases 
of  firm, measured saintliness, counselling her ‘to trust in the traditional remedies to the great 
passions – patience and time’ (Foucault, 2006, page 493).  
When not used in the strict sacramental sense, aveu and confession occupy the same 
semantic field as ‘admission’. In these instances, Foucault uses confession and aveu in a 
sense he would later formally define as the statement by the speaker of  a truth about 
 Maladie mentale et psychologie (Foucault, 1962) is a re-edited version of  this text which, however, also 3
contains no references to either avowal or confession.
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him/herself  which would both bind the speaker to that truth and alter their position 
within relations of  power. There are only two examples of  such usage. The first is a 
seventeen-year-old girl ‘raised with extreme indulgence’ who had fallen into a ‘gay, 
dreamy delirium’, jolted out of  it only with strict confrontation:  
Faced with the rigours of  this new threat, the patient felt herself  to be deeply moved ... and 
wound up admitting the error of  her ways, and made a frank confession (aveu) that she had fallen 
into her unreasoned state as a result of  heartbreak, even naming the person who had been its 
object. After that first confession (aveu), the cure became easy” (Foucault, 2006, page 507).  
The second example occurs in a passage in which Foucault uses aveu and confession 
interchangeably:  
In the fifteenth century, Gilles de Rais, accused of  having been and of  being still ‘a relapsed 
heretic, a sorcerer, a sodomite, an invoker of  evil spirits, a diviner, a killer of  the innocent, an 
apostate, an idolater, and a man who refused to see the error of  his ways’, ended up admitting his 
crimes ‘which were enough to send 10,000 people to their deaths’ in an extra-judicial confession 
[confession]. He made his confession (aveux) again in Latin in court, and then asked of  his own 
accord that the confession (confession) might be translated into the common language, so that 
everyone attending the court, most of  whom did not understand Latin, might understand, and 
that for his shame the publication and confession (confession) of  the aforementioned crimes might 
obtain more easily the remission of  his sins, and the favour of  God for the abolition of  the sins 
he had committed. In the civil trial, the same confession (confession) was required before the 
assembled public: ‘he was told by the judge that he should repeat his case in full out loud, and 
that the shame that he would feel would be an alleviation of  the torments that he would 
experience in the next world’. Until the seventeenth century, evil, in all its violence and 
inhumanity, could only be compensated for and punished if  it was brought out into the open. 
Only the light in which confession (aveu) and punishment are enacted can make up for the 
darkness in which evil was born. There was a cycle of  accomplishment of  evil, which necessarily 
involved public manifestation and avowal (aveu) before reaching the completion that eradicated it. 
Confinement, by contrast, betrays a consciousness where inhumanity can provoke nothing but 
shame. (Foucault, 2006, page 142). 
Here clearly aveu and confession are synonymous with admission and are located in a 
specifically judicial context. Both cases satisfy the definition of  avowal Foucault would 
later formalize as an utterance about the self  by which the speaking subject modifies its 
position in relations of  power, specifically a one-off  relationship rooted in a violation of  
the law. On the other hand, although this judicial context does entail that mise en discours 
of  the self  to which Foucault refers in his early definition of  confession, there is no trace 
of  the pathological deviance associated with delinquency or sin he will trace in later 
historical developments, much less of  the discursive economy of  the avowal inserted into 
sacramental confession or its further permutations throughout the social body (direction 
of  conscience, psychoanalysis, etc.). In both cases, nothing suggests these terms are 
being consciously deployed in an analytically significant manner. 
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That said, there are other aspects of  Folie et déraison which appear significant in terms 
of  the later analytical development of  avowal and confession. First, although the 
immediate context of  much of  Foucault’s discussion is the problem of  luxury, sexuality 
generally, and of  course unreason, it is fairly clear that the economy of  power of  a range 
of  different domains is structured around the separation of  the normal from the deviant. 
Second, these domains display a pathologisation of  difference at the ontological level. 
For example, Foucault argues that:  
In the classical age, poverty, laziness, vice and madness all blended into a single culpability 
inside unreason; the mad were locked up in the great confinement of  poverty and 
unemployment, but all were promoted to the vicinity of  sin, close to the essence of  the Fall. But 
madness now became more of  a social fall, confusedly perceived as its cause, model and limit. 
Within the space of  half  a century, mental illness would be treated as a form of  degeneration. 
And from then on, the essential madness, and the real threat, was something that floated up from 
the lower depths of  society (Foucault, 2006, page 495). 
Disease, both physical and mental, become sign and result of  a deeper deviance: 
marginality is associated with sin, with the essence of  the Fall, with an “essential 
madness”. Indeed, in light particularly of  Foucault’s later discussions of  the shift from 
Greco-Roman avowal aimed at mastery of  the self  to the Christian avowal-confessional 
dispositive which at its heart has a soul necessarily and irredeemably marked by sin, it 
seems important to note that the text presents this pathology as ultimately buried in the 
deepest recesses of  the soul. For example, Foucault notes that 
[I]t is at the end of  the Renaissance [sufferers of  ‘Naples Sickness’] began to be regarded with 
a new eye. Thierry de Héry was of  the opinion that none of  the causes usually advanced to 
explain the origins of  the disease, like pestilential air or contaminated water, provided a sufficient 
explanation: “For which reason we consider the disease to have its origins in the divine 
indignation of  the creator of  all things, who when he considered the libidinous, lascivious, 
petulant lust of  men allowed such ill to reign among them, as a revenge and punishment for the 
enormous sin of  luxury” (Foucault, 2006, page 84). 
The third aspect is the articulation of  these two domains – norm and deviance – 
through the coupling of  punishment/chastisement and avowal, a coupling in which 
Foucault awards a privileged position assigned to the avowal. Although unreason is 
utterly incommensurate with reason, the unreasonable/unreasoning subject’s position is 
not unalterable: despite the monstrosity and otherness of  deviance, healing is nonetheless 
possible, reason remains attainable. This makes it possible for the asylum, for 
confinement generally, to become the site of  a possible cure, the interface between 
reason and unreason at which a ‘moral synthesis’ is possible despite reason’s deafness to 
unreason. As Foucault observes: 
Pinel’s asylum was not to be a retreat from the world, a space of  nature and immediate truth 
like that of  Tuke, but a uniform domain of  legislation, a place of  moral syntheses where the 
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nascent alienation that came into being on the fringes of  society was to be eliminated. The lives 
led by the internees, and their behaviour towards doctors and guards, were organised by Pinel in 
such manner that these moral syntheses should be carried out (Foucault, 2006, page 495). 
The new asylum is a surface of  contact between reason and unreason in which the 
normalization of  deviance is made possible.  
The final aspect, which derives from the previous, is the particular way in which 
reason and unreason interact in such a space of  normalization. In the asylum, reason 
speaks not in dialogue, but to confront the threat of  the abnormal: it demands a certain 
performance as the price of  readmission, or at least as price of  such dialogue that might 
lead to readmission. Unreason is ontologically different, but the madman is not 
necessarily permanently other, and if  Thierry de Héry’s conclusion suggests the 
emergence of  the notion of  an insidious force of  deviance buried in the human soul, on 
the other hand there is always also the possibility of  resisting being dragged into its 
darkest recesses and even of  emerging permanently from them. The avowal, the 
vocalized admission of  deviance and guilt – not to mention debt – is precisely that bridge 
between sanity and insanity, reason and unreason, a performance that makes passage 
possible: 
In comparison to the incessant dialogue between reason and madness that had marked the 
Renaissance, classical confinement had been a silencing. But that silence was not total, and 
language was now engaged in things rather than totally suppressed. Confinement, prisons, 
dungeons, and even torture had set up a silent dialogue between reason and unreason, which was 
of  the order of  a struggle. That dialogue itself  was now undone, and the silence was absolute; 
there was no longer any common language between madness and reason, and all that answered 
the language of  delirium was an absence of  language, for delirium was not a fragment of  
dialogue with reason, but no language at all; its only reference, in the consciousness finally 
silenced, was guilt. And it was only from that point on that a common language was once more 
possible, after guilt had been recognised and acknowledged. ‘Finally, after a long period of  
hesitation, he was seen of  his own accord to mingle with the society of  the other patients...’ The 
absence of  language, as a fundamental structure of  life in the asylums, had as its correlative the 
renewal of  the act of  confession (aveu) (Foucault, 2006, page 497). 
But another component of  what in Government Of  The Living Foucault would call the 
confessional regime of  truth, punishment, was also necessary to undertake this path 
towards normality:  
From the earliest months of  the great confinement, the venereal had their place in the 
Hôpital Général. […] The Hôpital Général was therefore to admit the ‘corrupted’, but not 
without formality: a debt had to be paid to public morality, and patients had to be prepared on 
the path of  punishment and penance for their return to the communion from which sin had 
caused their expulsion. Entrance to the grand mal quarter was refused without the necessary 
paperwork: and the paper required was not a letter of  confession (confession), but a certificate of  
punishment (châtiment) (Foucault, 2006, pages 83–84). 
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The performance of  avowal/admission and of  punishment/chastisement become the 
conditions for readmission and normalization. Although the ontological condition of  
deviance which will be one of  the hallmarks of  Foucault’s analysis of  confession in 
Government of  the Living is present, the avowal still presents the possibility of  a full and 
final emancipation – unlike for the sinner, who can never be permanently free of  sin. In 
this sense, although Foucault does not present avowal in quite the formalized manner of  
his later work and although confession appears in nothing more than either a synonym 
of  admission or in its strictest theological sense, History of  Madness presents some which 
will be found among the conceptual groundwork for his later analysis. 
As for other monographs in the 1960s, his book on Raymond Roussel (Foucault, 
1963b, 1987), The Order of  Things (Foucault, 1966, 1970), and Archaeology of  Knowledge 
(Foucault, 1969, 2002) make no reference to either confession or avowal. Although it 
ignores confession specifically and the avowal generally, Birth of  the Clinic (Foucault, 
1963a, 1973) comes closest to the terrain Foucault will later draw on in his thinking about 
both, namely the question of  the normal and the pathological and the way systems of  
medical knowledge are permitted/permit, organize/are organised around this distinction. 
This articulation will be important in the emergence of  confession in the later Christian 
sense, which Foucault argues percolates throughout the social field in the period between 
the 16th and 19th centuries.  
The Contingency of  the Avowal: Law and Psychiatry 
This being said, there are signs that Foucault was developing an interest in the speech 
about the self  and its location in economies of  power. Throughout the 1960s Foucault’s 
texts become increasingly focused and nuanced on this point. Beyond book-length 
treatments, the avowal appears as early as 1962 – significantly, roughly 
contemporaneously with History of  Madness – in his introduction to Rousseau’s Rousseau 
Juge de Jean-Jacques. In this essay, aveu is mentioned whereas confession –despite the link 
between Rousseau, Augustine, and Foucault’s essay – does not appear. Avowal is 
presented in relation to what Foucault would later call the ‘consumption of  the avowal’, 
or demand for the avowal, displayed by the judicial system, and thus with the question of  
how avowal could become a form of  truth, even the privileged sign of  truth.  
In fact, judgment presumes the triumph (éclat) of  the word (parole): its edifice is by no measure 
sturdy unless it culminates in the avowal (aveu) of  the accused, in this spoken recognition of  the 
crime by the criminal. No one has the right to spare anyone from judgment: it must be possible 
to be judged and condemned, for it is necessary to have spoken (avoir parlé) in order to be 
chastised. The ordeal always presupposes speech (parole). Ultimately, the closed world of  the 
tribunal is less dangerous than the open space in which the accusing word encounters no 
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opposition because it propagates [itself] through silence (silence), and where the defense cannot 
convince because it responds to nothing but silence (mutisme)” (Foucault, 2001b, page 212). 
Several features of  Foucault’s analysis here are relevant: first, there is a demand, an 
expectation placed on the accused; second, aveu here is clearly located in the semantic 
field of  ‘admission’; third, the judicial system is the surface of  contact between legality 
and illegality (i.e. admissible and inadmissible, if  not yet normal and deviant); fourth, the 
performance of  such an admission is the price of  the errant subject’s normalization; and 
finally, the trial is in some sense analogue of  the therapeutic process, ferrying the subject 
from a condition of  exteriority to the community, to a re-established interiority. Foucault 
sees in this privilege of  the accused’s admission a demand for the avowal which turns the 
judicial system into a ‘consumer of  avowal’ (Foucault, 2001a, page 659). However, it is 
important to emphasize that the introspective admission in question is an admission of  
law-breaking fact, not of  deviant nature: the criminal is merely an offender, not yet the 
pathological other which Foucault identifies in figure of  the delinquent. As such, in the 
case of  the asylum, the transition from unreason to reason, to normality, remains always 
possible. 
The link between avowal and production of  truth is present again in a 1963 essay 
appearing in Médicine et Hygiène entitled “Water and Madness” (Foucault, 2001c). There 
are two elements which are significant in this article: first, this is the first of  Foucault’s 
publications in which he focuses on and elaborates specifically on the avowal, and 
secondly, Foucault focuses explicitly on the avowal’s function in an economy of  power. It 
is also interesting to note that the passage Foucault cites from Leuret is the same he will 
reprise in his 1981 Louvain lectures which focus specifically on the avowal in justice. 
Moreover, as he will remark in his later analysis of  confession in Abnormal (Foucault, 
2003) and in History of  Sexuality (Foucault, 1978), Foucault emphasises that the act of  
confessing itself  – in the sense of  admission, avowal in this specific sacramental context 
– brings shame, just as water humiliates in patients’ forced cold showers (Foucault, 
2014b, pages 184, cf100, 109). It is worth noting that in his later descriptions of  avowal 
in sacramental confession Foucault describes a process the four functions of  which, like 
Leuret’s cold showers, are to be painful, humiliating (mortifying), chastising (punishing), 
and reducing the patient to silence – silence as the moment of  a sinner’s acceptance that 
the willing recitation of  sins, actions, and thoughts may begin so that in the Confessor 
may in turn produce its/the sinner’s truth by assessing the sins and issuing penance/
satisfaction (cf. Foucault, 1976, pages 89–90, 1978, pages 66–67).  
Again, in this essay, Foucault gives no formal definition of  the avowal, and his 
emphasis throughout is on avowal as a mechanism through which one produces/
performs truth: Leuret inflicts cold showers the patient relentlessly until the painful water 
forces him to make an admission in words which the patient recognises as truth what he 
clearly believes to be false in fact, namely that he is mad. The patient performs the 
avowal of  a truth about himself, but he does not necessarily believe it – nor is he 
expected to. The cold water’s function is to extort the avowal: “water is the instrument of  
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avowal […] it forces madness to avow” (Foucault, 2001c, pages 297–298), and it is clear 
that the point of  the punishment is purely to extract this performance: water “represents 
the instance of  judgement in the asylum, [it is] the analogue of  fire from the heavens (feu 
du ciel). But this is a unique judgment: it has no purpose but to make the diseased avow 
[…] the madman must recognise he is mad” (Foucault, 2001c, pages 297–298). This 
leaves open the question of  what kind of  subjectivation might be taking place through 
this avowal: certainly subjection, subjugation of  the speaker, certainly the production of  
a statement that functions as truth in wider economies of  power, a modification of  the 
speaker’s own position within that economy, albeit simply to more fully justify his 
subjection to a certain process of  ‘normalization’. Whether there is subjectivation in the 
sense of  a change in the speaker’s own self-representation in the direction of  the avowal’s 
content is not necessarily clear, either in Foucault’s work or indeed in principle (Burchell, 
2009). Indeed, while the ‘therapeutic process’ which the avowal initiates purportedly is 
predicated precisely on changing that internal subjectivity, Foucault makes no mention of  
the latter among the functions of  the cold showers. Significantly, the manner in which 
the avowal is extracted, the way water forces unreason to avow its own folly is that it 
surprises, it is breath-taking, it makes the patient lose all countenance: “water has four 
functions: it is painful (and returns the subject to the world of  the immediacy of  
perception from which he has a tendency to escape ); it humiliates, by placing the 4
diseased (malade) before his truly sodden (détrempé) condition; it reduces to silence […] 
and finally it chastises (châtie)” (Foucault, 2001c, pages 297–298). 
It is important to note the difference in the way the avowal is configured in these two 
essays. In the introduction to Rousseau’s volume, Foucault describes a judicial context in 
which the demand for the avowal is not permanent (unlike the avowal in confession 
described in Government of  the Living) but rather is elicited only by a violation of  the law. 
There is nothing permanent about the demand for the subject’s mise en discours. On the 
other hand, in Water and Madness one finds the avowal – despite the method by which it is 
extracted – poised as bridge between Reason and Unreason in a manner strongly 
reminiscent of  History of  Madness, specifically as a transformation permitting the 
‘emancipation’ of  a patient, their ‘normalisation’, their return into the fold of  Reason. 
But again, this is a one-off  event: the demand for the avowal is permanent only so long 
as the individual remains in the field of  Unreason, and it is always possible to move away 
from this condition thus removing the demand upon oneself  to avow. 
Outside of  History of  Madness, this article remains the only other reference of  any 
conceptual or analytical depth in Foucault’s writing throughout the 1960s. The only other 
reference dates to a well-known 1965 interview with Alain Badiou, which does not 
mention avowal but does mention confession, two years after Water and Madness and four 
years after the first edition of  History of  Madness. Here, Foucault draws a parallel between 
psychology and a number of  other ‘cultural forms’ aiming at and structured around the 
telling of  oneself, amongst which confession. 
 This ‘tendency to escape’ is also the way Foucault describes sexuality as sin in History of  Sexuality.4
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Q: What is psychology? A: I will say that I do not think that one should attempt to define 
psychology as a science, but perhaps [rather] as a cultural form. This [form] is inscribed in a 
whole series of  phenomena which Western culture has known for a long time, and within which 
things like confession [confession] […] could appear (Foucault, 2001f, page 466). 
This passage provides far too little to infer much at all about what conceptual sense or 
analytical characteristics Foucault might have been attaching to ‘confession’, but it is 
enough to suggest that a decade before Abnormal and History of  Sexuality, he was thinking 
about it as a discrete economy of  power – a ‘cultural form’ – worthy of  analysis in its 
own right, and suggests Foucault may have been already thinking about more general 
processes of  which confession and psychology were specific instances. 
That being said, it does not seem that for Foucault any notion of  a historical shift was 
warranted: four years later, in 1969, Foucault again refers to the avowal and confession, 
and in the context of  judicial procedures, although this time to show that still at the end 
of  the sixteenth century the avowal was in certain cases – e.g. sorcery – an admission of  
guilt was in itself  not sufficient to determine punishment and as such had not yet taken 
on its role as a mechanism through which a uniquely privileged form of  truth is 
produced.  His 1969 candidacy presentation at the Collège de France mentions neither 5
avowal nor confession, but it does speak in terms of  Foucault’s analyses of  exclusionary 
processes and the constitution of  bodies of  knowledge (connaissance, but also savoir) 
particularly bodies of  knowledge under the rubric of  science, and thus indirectly the 
question of  the normal and the pathological he develops from Caguilheme or the 
question of  the limit in Bataille (Foucault, 1994). 
Avowal and Judgment in Law in the Early 1970s 
Confession also makes an appearance as a solitary but again perhaps significant 
occurrence in Foucault’s 1970 The Order of  Discourse, the introductory lecture at the 
Collège de France in which he maps the main directions he intends to pursue in his 
research and teaching there. Here, in the context of  what he calls “functions of  
exclusion” such as “the disjunction of  madness and reason in the classical age” and “that 
concerning sexuality from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century,” it was a question of  
“seeing not [so much] how it was progressively and – and happily – disappeared, but with 
the way it was displaced and rearticulated through a practice of  confession (confession) 
following which the prohibited conducts were named, classified, organized hierarchically 
in the most explicit manner – up until the initially certainly timid and delayed appearance 
of  the theme of  sexuality in nineteenth century psychiatry” (Foucault, 1972, page 232). 
 “the facts are established according to the rules, the avowal (aveu) was obtained, the accused – a young 5
shepherd – himself  gives further indications concerning his crime, [but] even the avowal is not considered 
[to be] sufficient” (Foucault, 2001d, page 784).
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Here, still, confession appears in its theological guise as a site operating categorization 
and exclusion, explicitly in relation to sexuality rather than in more generalized forms, 
but also – implicitly – as that bridge between the state of  abnormality (deviance or 
pathology) and normality.  
Confession and avowal recur in the same text again in Foucault’s lectures on The Will 
to Know (1970-71) (Foucault, 2011, 2013b) – his first course delivered at the Collège de 
France – which focuses much more clearly on this problem, and contains references, 
albeit sparse, to both avowal and confession. Although neither of  these concepts is 
presented as central in the line of  argument being developed, the cases recounted in Will 
to Know involve oath/vow/avowal as a yielding up to be judged as witnesses to 
themselves (though potentially also to others), to have the truth exposed/written/
established, and in any case being bound to and subjected to that truth. Foucault’s text 
presents both avowal and confession as forms of  truth-telling, with not only aveu but also 
confession still remaining within the semantic field of  admission – albeit clearly in the sense 
of  an admission with some juridical value and which is in some way costly to the speaker. 
Three kinds of  truth telling are identified, all in judicial or quasi-judicial – rather than 
sacramental – contexts.  
First, there is the ordeal, which guaranteed the truthfulness of  the oath of  adversaries 
equal in social rank when the oath of  one was not acceptable, and likewise for women, 
exposed children, and slaves.  
When two adversaries were not of  equal rank and the oath (serment) of  one was not 
acceptable, he was subject to the ordeal: this was the case with women (with the test of  the rock), 
exposed children, and slaves. The physical danger with which one confronted them, their torture, 
was their oath of  truth. It is curious to see how this test of  truth by the torture of  slaves was 
preserved throughout Greek judicial practice, but gradually taking on a different role: in the 
fourth century it involves getting a confession (il s’agit de faire avouer) from slaves who could have 
witnessed actions of  their masters, but whose servile condition would prevent them from telling 
the truth (Foucault, 2013b, page 85). 
Second, there is Christian inquisitorial practice and the link between torture and oath/
truth. 
Glotz has maybe said the most important thing about the Greek ordeal [The martyr keeps the 
truth up to and including execution and with the uncertain possibility of  God coming to save 
him. Note by MF], but the Inquisition should be studied in this perspective. There, the test of  
truth is complicated by the Christian behavior of  confession (l’aveu). But the Inquisition is not 
purely and simply a matter of  techniques for getting the confession (aveu). There is a whole 
network of  disjunctions which support the inquisitorial test: - either you resist the test and do not 
confess to being a sorcerer; this means that that the devil has enabled you to bear the unbearable; 
therefore you are a fiend. […] – or you do not resist the test and confess (tu avoues): this mean 
that you are really Satan’s henchman. Therefore you deserve to be punished. Punishment which 
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we promised you would escaped if  you confessed (si tu avouais). But your confession (aveu) means 
that you are forgiven and will die absolved (Foucault, 2013b, pages 85–86). 
And finally there is confession and avowal in the production of  different kinds of  
truth, oracular as opposed to judicial, in Oedipus Rex: 
In Oedipus the King there are two types of  knowledge which fit together and finally form an 
orthon epos. Two types of  knowledge which know the same thing (the murder and the incest), but 
one proclaiming it in the form of  the oracle, of  clairvoyance, of  divination; a knowledge that 
nothing escapes, the seer’s blindness equivalent to the god’s light. The other is a knowledge 
extracted in the form of  testimony, memory, and confession (aveu): he knows only what he has 
seen and done; beyond this he can say nothing (Foucault, 2013c, page 238).   6
In Will to Know, Foucault’s concern seems to have shifted back to a juridical dimension 
with particular attention to the question of  the violation of  law and away from the 
emphasis on the moral, emotional or mental deviance of  unreason characteristic of  his 
earlier book-length work. These two concerns will converge in his later work – e.g. the 
identification of  the figure of  the delinquent in Discipline and Punish.  
In 1972, a full decade after his comments on Rousseau, there are two instances in 
which Foucault mentions avowal – although not confession – both again in the context 
of  the judicial process’ production of  statements that can function as truth. The first is 
the well-known ‘Dialogue with Maoists’. Here, Foucault refers to ‘people’s tribunals’ in 
which “interrogations the purpose of  which was to establish the ‘truth’ or obtain the 
‘avowal’ (aveu)” (Foucault, 1980, page PAGE). Clearly the text puts forward no 
conceptualisation of  the avowal. However, it does refer to the avowal in a (quasi)judicial 
context as a privileged sign of  truth, a statement that functions as truth, but also a truth 
to which an individual binds itself  in submission to an authority – in this case 
‘revolutionary tribunals’.  
The second is the 1971-1972 lectures at the Collège de France, Théories et institutions 
pénales and the related course summary. Foucault’s 1971-1972 course, seems to mark a 
transition point towards a more systematic attention to the avowal, while on the other 
hand mentioning confession rarely. The lectures go close to explicitly defining aveu as an 
act of  justice rooted in the subject’s statement of  a truth about itself  (Foucault, 2015, 
page 116) ; the final lecture of  March 8th focuses on the transition point between ancient 7
systems of  justice based on the trial or test and modern systems based on investigation 
and inquisition (Foucault, 2015, pages 202–206); and it ultimately prefigures the “ethical 
and religious link between subject and truth” (Foucault, 2015, page 207) and the 
attendant complex economy of  the avowal involving recognition, purification, 
 Oedipal Knowledge is published as an appendix to Will to Know as it was based on a development of  the 6
March 17th lecture, delivered in turn at SUNY in March and Cornell in October 1972.
 “The idea that the act of  justice passes through or rests on the enunciation of  the truth is itself  also a 7
later phenomenon”.
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subjectivation, and truth. The same pages also reference Foucault’s claim in his essay on 
Rousseau a decade earlier that the modern and contemporary justice system’s demand for 
the avowal and thus torture is rooted in the avowals “allure as [equivalent of  the] test 
(épreuve)” (Foucault, 2015, page 206). However, no explicit definition of  the avowal is 
formulated. In addition, mentions of  confession are rare and in any case strictly related to 
the semantic field of  admission (Foucault, 2015, page 139), not to the sacramental 
economy of  power which Foucault will focus on later, roughly from Abnormal onwards. 
This suggests that at this point Foucault has not yet identified confessional economies of  
power (sacramental confession, direction of  conscience, etc.).  
Confirming this configuration, the course summary makes no reference to confession, 
while the avowal, as in the lectures, is understood as personal pronouncement which 
both produces a statement functioning as truth and binds the individual to that truth and 
to a juridical, ‘inquisitorial’ system which demands it and extracts it: 
It is from this set of  practices that [the following] arise/emerge: the typical questions of  the 
investigation (who did what? Is the fact of  public interest? who saw it and can bear witness? 
What are the indications, what is the evidence? Has there been an avowal (aveu)?); the stages of  
the inquiry […]; the characters of  the inquiry (he who pursues, he who denounces, he who has 
seen, he who denies or who avows; he who must judge and make the decision) […] We belong to 
an inquisitorial civilization which, for centuries maintained, practiced according to the most 
complex forms which [nonetheless] are rooted in the same model, the extraction, the 
displacement, the accumulation of  knowledge (savoir). The inquisition: form of  power-knowledge 
essential to our society. The truth of  experience is the daughter of  the inquisition – of  the 
political, administrative, judicial power to ask questions, to extort responses, to gather testimony, 
to verify statements, to establish facts (Foucault, 2001g, page 1259). 
While in a fully confessional economy of  power the inquisition is the counterpart of  
confession, Foucault does not speak in these terms here, and the technology though 
which confession is demanded and extracted/extorted, the target of  this ‘extraction and 
accumulation of  knowledge’ is not an inner truth about the deviant nature of  the self, 
but rather ‘to establish facts’. 
A further reference to confession – but not avowal – occurs in Truth and Juridical Forms 
(May 1973), in the context of  an analysis of  the emergence of  modern juridical forms 
through judicial practices in the Church of  the Middle Ages – specifically investigations 
into crimes conducted by a Bishop (visitatio, inquisitio generalis, inquisitio specialis) (Foucault, 
2001h). In the context of  these judicial practices, Foucault again speaks of  confession in 
the sense of  admission, as an act of  truth-telling by the perpetrator of  a crime. It is clear 
that already at this stage the demand for such an admission signalled the privileged 
position of  the avowal in the sense of  the accused’s speech about himself: such was the 
value as evidence and truth assigned to this kind of  speech that “a confession (confession) 
by the guilty [party] could interrupt the inquisition at any stage” of  the inquiry (Foucault, 
2001h, page 1450) bringing a Bishop’s investigation into that crime to a close. It is also 
clear that Foucault does not claim that a pathologisation – as either law-breaker or sinner 
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– is at the heart of  this system’s understanding of  the criminal, as he will much later 
claim for later judicial practice in Discipline and Punish. In this sense, as well as in the 
absence of  a chastising or humiliating dimension of  inquisitorial practice, the economy 
of  power that arose around the avowal in Church judicial practice is fundamentally 
different from its nineteenth century temporal counterpart. 
Thus, both in the 1970-71 Will to Know lectures and in the 1974 analysis of  truth and 
juridical forms, once again Foucault’s presentation is that of  an avowal demanded by the 
judicial system, but in which this demand is only elicited by a violation of  the law: again, 
there is nothing permanent about the mise-en-discours of  the self  through such truth-
telling, much less is there a founding opposition such as that between Reason and 
Unreason structuring the social field and underpinning the demand for the avowal. 
Conclusions: Three Figures of  the Avowal and Confession 
A close reading of  Foucault’s early work permits several conclusions. First, concerning 
the differentiation between aveu and confession, while it is clear that all the elements of  the 
avowal and of  confession are present, by the standards of  Foucault’s later formal 
definitions, not only does he not offer definitions of  these, but nowhere are these 
elements explicitly linked together. Instead, there is a considerable overlap in Foucault’s 
usage, with aveu and confession often occupying the same semantic field as ‘admission’, and 
being linked primarily to species of  judicial procedures across a range of  domains 
(secular and religious justice, psychiatry, etc.). During the 1960s, the central contributions 
Foucault makes are in the context of  History of  Madness and of  the essay on Water and 
Madness, and even here, avowal and confession appear infrequently and are not the focus 
of  sustained analytical development. Secondly, compared to the avowal, a specific 
epistemology of  confession is nearly entirely absent: at this stage, confession remains 
underdeveloped, and certainly not autonomous, conceptually or analytically. Third, such 
an absence of  a explicit analytical differentiation does not mean aveu and confession are 
interchangeable. Foucault’s early work contains core elements which later emerge as the 
roots of  a more distinct usage. First, while confession appears in both judicial and 
sacramental contexts, aveu always refers to the subject’s utterance of  a truth about itself  
and never designates the broader sacramental practice. Second, aveu is more closely 
associated with different kinds of  judicial procedures, while confession appears in the 
sacramental context and in domains such as sexuality and psychiatry – which are 
structured by an ontological opposition between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ states – 
prefiguring the analysis of  confession in GotL. Third, Foucault’s texts develop a concern 
with the articulation of  the avowal across different economies of  power: while the 
avowal is a component of  the confessional dispositive, it can also be found in several 
other dispositives (judicial procedures, therapeutic process, etc.) which do not necessarily 
display the characteristic of  sacramental confession.  
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The difficulty in distinguishing between aveu and confession is rooted not simply in 
semantic complexities or even Foucault’s occasionally overlapping usage, but in the fact 
that there are not one, nor two, but three figures which these terms cover in Foucault’s 
work.  
First, confession/aveu as admission of  law-breaking, which makes no assumptions about 
the nature of  the speaking subject. This relation has the characteristics of  a one-off  
event: there are – in principle – no necessary forces leading to this point, much less to its 
repetition. Foucault’s 1962 introduction to Rousseau’s volume is exemplary in this 
respect. Semantically, aveu indicates ‘admission’, and conceptually the avowal becomes the 
point of  contact between the (legally) admissible and the inadmissible. Alongside 
evidential proof  and tariffed expiation, avowal of  culpability and/or guilt is the price of  
readmission into the former, subtly transforming the justice system into a ‘consumer of  
avowals’. But violation of  the law is not yet reducible to a pathological alterity: the avowal 
changes the individual’s status, but not its nature. 
Second, in an ontologically ‘bipolar’ space structured around an incommensurable 
difference (e.g. the asylum) the event of  the avowal makes possible a trajectory of  
emancipation (e.g. from unreason towards reason, etc.). The introspective admission in 
question is one of  law-breaking fact, not of  deviant nature: the criminal is merely an 
offender, not yet the pathological other which Foucault identifies in figure of  the 
delinquent. Thus, in the case of  the asylum, the transition from unreason to reason, to 
normality, remains always possible. Exemplary of  this kind of  economy of  power are 
History of  Madness and Water and Madness. Both texts present an ontological split between 
Reason and Madness in which the avowal functions as condition for normalization, with 
full transition from Unreason to Reason operated by the avowal and remaining always 
possible through a specified set of  transformations. 
Finally, a third type of  economy of  power is associated with what Foucault initially 
identifies as ‘sacramental confession’: in this space, ontological differences between the 
normal and the deviant are not only utterly different in nature, they are also 
irreconcilable. While the avowal lies at the heart of  this economy of  power also, here it is 
only nominally capable of  affecting the subject’s emancipation: the avowing subject’s 
normalisation is undermined by a subjectivity already and necessarily flawed, trapped by 
its own alterity. In other words, the emancipation of  the avowing subject is undermined 
by the formulation of  a subjectivity marked by flawed nature (original sin, the delinquent, 
the degenerate, etc.). In History of  Madness, it is possible to see the beginning of  what will 
be the defining trait of  a confessional economy of  power: the emergence of  the 
permanence of  the demand for avowal rooted in an inescapably deviant alterity. here, 
Foucault notes a shift towards a pathologisation of  difference in which forms of  social 
marginality – poverty, laziness, vice, madness, unemployment, sin, etc. – become 
increasingly both sign and result of  a deeper deviance (Foucault, 2006, pages 84, 495). 
This shift is what sets confession aside from the avowal: through Tertullian and monastic 
practices, Christianity comes to place sin at the heart of  the individual, and in psychiatry 
Foucault detects a similar shift from error to fault and stain, a shift he will later 
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investigate in Abnormal and which will become a major theme of  his later work (e.g. on 
avowal, confession, biopolitics, parrhesia). 
The defining trait of  confession turns precisely on the specification of  the type of  
alterity which characterizes a punishable subjectivity – i.e. whether difference/deviance 
from the norm are pathological or perfectible – and whether bridging the two is possible. 
In the first two forms of  the avowal, normalisation is always possible. In the third form, 
however, emancipation is undermined. There are therefore three different economies of  
avowal/confession: singular event, linear trajectory, and a cycle of  struggle marked by an 
inevitable return. What makes it difficult to discern the specificity of  confession as 
opposed to (forms of) avowal in Foucault is precisely the status of  (pathological) alterity. 
With the qualified exception of  History of  Madness, Foucault’s early texts do not point to a 
source of  pathology as cause behind a fault/defect ingrained in the figure enjoined upon 
to avow/admit. Only later is the self  both obscure (to itself, above all) and its source of  
deviance located precisely within that point of  inscrutability, thus requiring constant 
scrutiny. Until the emergence of  the figure of  the delinquent, the judicial context focuses 
on violations of  the law, not on deviance inscribed into the nature of  the self. The 
hallmark of  a properly confessional economy of  power is precisely this play between 
demanded avowal, pathological alterity, and impossible emancipation: only under these 
conditions is it possible for the subject’s mise en discours to be routinized. Yet it is precisely 
this interplay which is absent from the application of  the idea of  ‘man as a confessing 
[sic] animal’ that has proven so popular. If  the analysis presented here is correct, those 
applications will need to be re-thought, either re-qualifying them as forms of  a simpler 
avowal, or investigating the presence of  a pathological alterity ensures their ability to 
reproduce over time. 
Andrea Teti 
Confession and Avowal in Foucault’s early work, 1954-1972 
Confession is one of  Foucault’s best-known concepts, it is also one of  his most 
misunderstood. While confession and aveu are usually translated as ‘confession’ and used 
interchangeably, this article begins to disentangle them by examining all material by 
Foucault published between 1954 and 1972, tracing their origin and development. This 
yields a number of  preliminary conclusions. First, by the standards of  later definitions, 
while all elements of  the avowal and of  confession are present, nowhere are they 
explicitly linked together. Specifically, although the idea of  pathological ‘deviance’ set 
against ‘normality’ is present, only later will Foucault examine the importance of  
deviance in confessional dispositives. Instead, aveu and confession often occupy the 
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semantic field of  ‘admission’, and are linked to judicial procedures. Secondly, as epistemic 
framework, while the avowal is part of  the confessional dispositive, it is also found in 
other contexts with different characteristics. Thirdly, the difficulty in distinguishing 
between avowal (aveu) and confession (confession) is rooted in the fact that these terms 
cover not two but three economies of  power: avowal as admission of  law-breaking, which 
makes no assumptions about the nature of  the speaking subject; avowal in a space such 
as the asylum, entailing a one-off  emancipation from unreason towards reason; and 
confession, where the avowing subject’s emancipation from alterity is undermined by a 
pathological subjectivity, flawed by nature. Consequently, applications of  Foucault’s 
extraordinarily popular ‘confessing animal’ will need to be re-examined. 
Keywords: Foucault, Confession, Avowal, Aveu 
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 232-252  249
Teti Confession and Avowal in Foucault’s early work
Bibliography 
Bevir M, 1999, Foucault and critique: Deploying agency against autonomy, in Political Theory,  27(1) 
65–84. 
Brion F, Harcourt B E, 2014, Editor’s Preface, in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of  
the Avowal in Justice Eds M Foucault, F Brion and B E Harcourt (University of  Chicago 
Press), 1–10 
Burchell G, 2009, Confession, resistance, subjectivity, in Journal for Cultural Research 13(2) 159–
177 
Dreyfus H, Rabinow P, 1983 Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 2nd 
edition (University of  Chicago Press, Chicago) 
Elden S, 2005, The problem of  confession: the productive failure of  Foucault’s History of  Sexuality’ 
in Journal for Cultural Research 9(1) 23–41 
Fejes A, Dahlstedt M, 2013 The confessing society: Foucault, confession and practices of  lifelong 
learning (Routledge, London) 
Fejes A, Nicoll K, 2015 Foucault and a Politics of  Confession in Education (Routledge, 
London) 
Foucault M, 1954 Maladie mentale et personnalité (PUF, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1961 Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Plon, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1962 Maladie mentale et psychologie (PUF, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1963a Naissance de la Clinique: une archéologie du regard medical (PUF, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1963b Raymond Roussel (Gallimard, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1966 Les mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines (Gallimard, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1969 L’archéologie du savoir (Gallimard, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1970 The Order of  Things: An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences (Pantheon, 
New York) 
Foucault M, 1972, The Discourse on Language, in Archaeology of  Knowledge (Pantheon, New 
York) 
Foucault M, 1973 The Birth of  the Clinic: An Archaeology of  Medical Perception (Routledge, 
London) 
Foucault M, 1976 Histoire de la Sexualité 1: Volonté de savoir (Gallimard/Jeunesse, Paris) 
Foucault M, 1978 The History of  Sexuality, vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge (Penguin, London) 
Foucault M, 1980, On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists, in Power/Knowledge: Selected 
interviews and writings, 1972-1977 Eds M Foucault and C Gordon (Pantheon, New York), 
pp 1–36 
Foucault M, 1987 Death and the Labyrinth: the World of  Raymond Roussel (Althone, London) 
Foucault M, 1993, About the Beginning of  the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth in Political Theory 
21(2) 198–227 
Foucault M, 1994, Candidacy Presentation: Collège de France, 1969, in The Essential Works of  
Michel Foucault, vol. 1: Ethics Ed P Rabinow (The New Press, New York), pp 5–10 
Foucault M, 2001a, Du bon usage tu criminel   in Dits et Écrits II, 1976-1988 (Gallimard, Paris), 
pp 658–662 
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 232-252  250
Teti Confession and Avowal in Foucault’s early work
Foucault M, 2001b, Introduction   in Rousseau, J.-J. Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques : Dialogues, 
Paris, A. Colin, 1962, pp. VII-XXIV’, in Dits et Écrits vol. I, 1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), 
pp 200–216 
Foucault M, 2001c, L’eau et la folie , in Médicine et Hygiène, 21e année, n. 613, 23 octobre 
1963, pp. 901-906’, in Dits et Écrits vol. I, 1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), pp 296–300 
Foucault M, 2001d, Médecins, juges et sorciers au XVIIe siècle  in Médecine de France, n. 200, 
1er trimestre 1969, pp. 121-128’, in Dits et Écrits vol. I, 1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), pp 
781–794 
Foucault M, 2001e, Michel Foucault  : Les réponses du philosophe  entretien avec C. Bojunga et R. 
Lobo ; trad. P.W. Prado Jr.) Jornal da Tarde, 1er novembre 1975, pp. 12-13, in Dits et Écrits 
vol. I, 1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), pp 1675–1685 
Foucault M, 2001f, Philosophie et psychologie  entretien avec A. Badiou Dossiers pédagogiques de 
la radiotélévision scolaire, 27 février 1965, pp. 65-71’, in Dits et Écrits vol. I, 1954-1975 
(Gallimard, Paris), pp 466–476 
Foucault M, 2001g, Théories et institutions pénales , Annuaire du Collège de France, 72e 
année, Histoire des systèmes de la pensée, année 1971-1972, 1972, pp. 283-286’, in Dits et 
Écrits vol. I, 1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), pp 1257–1261 
Foucault M, 2001h, La vérité et les formes juridiques , orig.   verdade e as formas juridicas  trad. 
J. W. Prado Jr. Cadernos da P.U.C., 16 juin 1974, pp. 5-133’, in Dits et Écrits vol. I, 
1954-1975 (Gallimard, Paris), pp 1406–1513 
Foucault M, 2002 Archaeology of  Knowledge (Routledge, London) 
Foucault M, 2003 Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-75 (Verso, London) 
Foucault M, 2006 History of  Madness 2nd revised Eds J Khalfa and J Murphy (Routledge, 
London) 
Foucault M, 2011 Leçons sur la volonté de savoir: Cours au Collège de Frace, 1970-1971 
(Gallimard Seuil, Paris) 
Foucault M, 2012a Du gouvernement des vivants. Cours au Collège de France. 1979-1980 Ed M 
Senellart (Hautes Etudes, Gallimard, Seuil, Paris) 
Foucault M, 2012b Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonction de l’aveu en justice Eds F Brion and B E 
Harcourt (Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain) 
Foucault M, 2013a La Société Punitive: Cours au Collège de France, 1972-1973 (EHESS/
Gallimard/Seuil, Paris) 
Foucault M, 2013b Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970-1971 
(Palgrave-Macmillan, London) 
Foucault M, 2013c, Oedipal Knowledge, in Lectures on the Will to Know, Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1970-1971 (Palgrave-Macmillan, London), pp 229–261 
Foucault M, 2014a On the Government of  the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980 
(Palgrave-Macmillan, London) 
Foucault M, 2014b Wrong-doing, truth-telling: the function of  avowal in justice Eds F Brion and 
B E Harcourt (University of  Chicago Press) 
Foucault M, 2015 Théories et Institutions Pénales, Cours au Collège de France: 1971-1972 
(EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, Paris) 
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 232-252  251
Teti Confession and Avowal in Foucault’s early work
Karma L, 1997, Desiring Foucault in Journal of  Medieval and Early Modern Studies 27(1) 3–16 
Van Maanen J, 1988, Confessional Tales, in Tales of  the Field: On Writing Ethnography 
(University of  Chicago Press, Chicago) 
Rail G, 2012, The Birth of  the Obesity Clinic: Confessions of  the Flesh, Biopedagogies and 
Physical Culture’ Sociology of  Sport Journal 29(2) 227–253 
Roberts M, 2005, The production of  the psychiatric subject in Nursing Philosophy 6(1) 33–42 
Salter M B, 2007, Governmentalities of  an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession in International 
Political Sociology 1(1) 49–66 
Tadros V, 1998, Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault in Oxford 
Journal of  Legal Studies 18(1) 75–103 
Taylor C, 2008 The Culture of  Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy of  the 
‘Confessing Animal’ (Routledge, London) 
Webster J, 2008, Establishing the “truth”of  the matter: Confessional reflexivity as introspection and 
avowal in Psychology & Society 1(1) 65–76 
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 232-252  252
